Every federal contract award is published: who won it, what it is worth, which agency awarded it, when it starts and when it ends. That means your entire federal portfolio, and every competitor's, is a matter of public record.
Evergreen has taken 355 awards worth $197,149,055 since October 2018. Read one at a time they say very little. Added up and sorted by end date, they say something specific and time-bound.
This review rebuilds the book you are holding right now rather than the history you have already delivered. It tests seven responses and rejects five. The finding is not that anything has gone wrong. It is that two facts which are comfortable on their own are uncomfortable together.
Sorted by the year each contract started, your record shows no decline in the ability to win. 2024 and 2025 were your two strongest years in seven.
So nothing in this report is about a business losing its edge. A firm that wins $21m of new work two years running is doing the hardest part right. The question is what happens next, and that lives in a different column of the same records.
Each of those contracts also carries an end date. Group the 40 that are still live by when they finish, and three quarters of the value lands inside the next eighteen months.
A recompete is not a loss. Incumbents win most of them. But 35 of them inside eighteen months is a workload, and it arrives whether or not the team has capacity for it that quarter.
Read by sub-agency, as above, that looks like a spread of customers. It is not. Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Operations Command are all the Department of Defense, and together with the rest of its components they are 99.8% of $197.1m across 355 awards. Everything outside Defense, across all 4 departments that have ever awarded you, comes to less than a quarter of one percent.
Concentration is not automatically a weakness. Knowing one customer deeply is usually why a contractor wins repeatedly, and your win rate suggests exactly that. The risk is narrower and worth naming precisely: a single customer changing how it buys reaches 93% of what you hold.
That could be a decision to bundle several small contracts into one larger vehicle, a shift to a different contract type, or a budget change at one installation. None of those is a judgement about your work. All of them would arrive at the same time as the recompete window in Part 1.
Each play below was checked against your own award record and against what the public solicitation files show about how this customer buys. The point of publishing the rejections is that they are the expensive part to work out.
| Forward play | What the record prices it at | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Build the recompete calendar and separate real expiries from option years | Costs a day, uses documents you already hold, and can show the entire cliff is an artifact of how end dates get published. | Pursue |
| Open early conversations about how this work will be recompeted | Bundling several small contracts into one larger vehicle is the single event that would hurt most, and acquisition strategy is usually discussed before a solicitation appears. | Second |
| Diversify beyond the Department of the Army | 93% concentration is real and worth addressing, but a new agency relationship takes longer than the eighteen-month window it would be meant to protect. Right answer, wrong clock. | Hold |
| Win more new work | Already happening at the highest rate in seven years. $21.7m in 2024 and $21.4m in 2025. There is no evidence of a problem here to fix. | Rejected |
| Expand into new geography | Your award record is concentrated around installations near Tacoma. Moving geography means competing without the site knowledge that appears to be why you win, against incumbents who have it. | Rejected |
| Move up to larger prime contracts | Nothing in the record shows you losing on size. Chasing larger vehicles would put you against national primes while the 35 recompetes you already hold go unattended. | Rejected |
| Subcontract to spread the customer risk | Subcontract awards are inconsistently published, so we cannot see whether you already do this or price what it would be worth. Not rejected on merit, only unmeasurable from outside. | Untestable |
There is no honest way to forecast this from outside, and we are not going to pretend otherwise. What the record supports is a range, and the shape of what falls inside it.
| If you retain | Of the $38.2m expiring | Book after 18 months | What that would mean |
|---|---|---|---|
| 100% | $38.2m | about $50.8m | No change. Requires winning all 35 recompetes. |
| 85% | $32.5m | about $45.0m | A normal incumbent retention rate. The book shrinks 11%. |
| 70% | $26.7m | about $39.3m | The book shrinks 23%, and new wins have to cover the difference. |
| 50% | $19.1m | about $31.7m | The book shrinks 38%, which is a different sized company. |
Your new-award record makes the top rows more plausible than the bottom ones. You won $21.7m in 2024 and $21.4m in 2025 without any of these recompetes landing. A firm winning at that rate is not usually one that loses most of its recompetes.
Many federal contracts run one base year with several option years the customer can exercise. The published end date is often the end of the current period rather than the end of the relationship. If most of your 35 expiring contracts are mid-option rather than genuinely ending, the cliff in Part 1 is an artifact of how end dates are recorded and the correct response is to do nothing. This is the single most likely reason this report is wrong, and you can settle it in an hour with your own contract files.
You do a specialised thing at a specific kind of site. The customer that owns most of those sites in your region is the Army. Diversifying customers may mean diversifying geography or trade, which is a much larger decision than a portfolio adjustment and could easily be a worse business than the one you have.
If you track your own end dates in a schedule, none of Part 1 is news, and the value of this document is limited to the competitor picture. We have no way to see your internal systems from the public record, and a report that assumes you are not paying attention would be a poor one.
The recommendation is deliberately the smallest one available. Line up all 40 live contracts by end date, mark which are true expiries and which are option exercises, and put the resulting workload against the weeks available. That single view decides whether anything else in this report deserves attention.
| Why this play and not the other six | What the record says |
|---|---|
| It is time-bound and nothing else here is | $38.2m of work, across 35 contracts, all inside eighteen months |
| Winning is not the constraint, so do not spend effort there | $43.1m of new awards across 2024 and 2025, your two best years |
| It costs a day and can cancel the rest of the report | If most expiries are option years, Part 1 dissolves and nothing needs doing |
| Customer diversification cannot arrive in time | A new agency relationship takes longer than the window it would need to protect |
| The information is already yours | 40 contracts, already signed. The work is reading them together rather than finding anything |
Take the 35 contracts expiring inside eighteen months and mark each as a genuine recompete or an option the customer can simply exercise. If most are options, Part 1 is an artifact of how end dates get published and you can stop here. That result would be worth knowing on its own.
Recompetes cluster. Count how many fall in the same eight-week windows and set that against who actually writes your proposals. The constraint in this business is rarely the work and often the number of people who can write while the current jobs continue.
The single event that would hurt most is several of your smaller contracts being combined into one larger vehicle you are too small to bid alone. Contracting officers will usually discuss acquisition strategy ahead of a solicitation. That conversation is free, and it is far more useful eighteen months out than eighteen days out.
If the calendar turns out to be manageable, the 93% concentration becomes the next question rather than an urgent one. Handle it in that order. Doing it the other way round spends the scarce months on the slower problem.
We are Scalable OS. We work with public records: federal contract awards, agency records and public solicitation files. From those we reconstruct from them what is actually happening inside a business and the market around it. Then we send that to the business, unsolicited, before there is any relationship at all.
The reason is straightforward. The analysis in this document is the kind that normally arrives after a retainer, a discovery phase and a scoping call, which means most contractors never see it at any point in their working lives. It is not expensive to produce, because the underlying records are public and free. It is that nobody has a reason to produce it for you until you are already a client. We would rather demonstrate the work than describe it.
There is a second reason, and it is the one that decided the shape of this document: nothing in it was requested. A search engine or an assistant answers the question you thought to ask. This report exists to raise the ones nobody inside your business has had a reason to ask, because your own contract end dates are scattered across 40 separate documents and nobody adds them up.
That is also the limit. The public record shows what was awarded and when it ends. It cannot show what you were paid, what the work earned, or which of your end dates are real. Four things would change the analysis:
Send us The figures below. Each one is an input to a number this report could not compute from the public record: revenue by agency and by contracting office for the last three years; obligated versus remaining ceiling on each active award; period of performance end date for every award at the dominant agency; proposals submitted outside the dominant agency, and their outcomes. and we will send back this same review rebuilt on your actual numbers: